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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STAE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

v,

:

DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 20041095-CA

:

POINT I. MR. ANDERSON'S CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING ARGUMENT
WAS PROPERLY PRESERVED WHERE THE ISSUE WAS RAISED AND
THE TRIAL COURT RULED ON THE ISSUE.
Utah case law establishes that the doctrine of waiver only "has application if
defendants fail to raise claims at the appropriate time at the trial level, so the judge has an
opportunity to rule on the issue." State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37,1J9, 46 P.3d 230, 232. Two
policy reasons exist for the preservation rule, first, the rule "give[s] the trial court an
opportunity to 'address the claimed error, and if appropriate correct it,5 and second, . . . 'a
defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of
enhancing the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,. . .
claiming on appeal the Court should reverse." Id. at ^[10 (citation omitted). The second
policy reason does not have application in this case where Mr. Anderson had already
been convicted and only challenges the trial court's imposition of his sentences as
consecutive for the first time at the order to show cause hearing. R. 55:19, Furthermore,

there is no strategic reason for failing to mention something that would assist the trial
court in ensuring the defendant received the lower sentence for which he was arguing.
In this case, Mr. Anderson brought to the trial court's attention that it could only
impose the original prison term ordered. R. 55:19. Mr. Anderson stated:
Judge, I believe Judge Atherton sentenced him on these other charges
concurrently and that took place after the sentencing with regard to these
particular cases. So it would be our position - 1 don't know if it was ever,
what the sentence was in the first place if you ordered it consecutive or not
but if you ordered it concurrent than it would be our position that that [sic]
concurrent sentencing would rule the day.
R. 55:18-19.
The trial court then specifically ruled that based on the "kinds of charges that [Mr.
Anderson] admitted committing] while on probation it seems that it would be just in my
judgment to run them consecutively, run this charge consecutively with the others. The
others are serious violent charges apparently involving firearms, so I'll impose this to run
consecutively." R. 55:19.
Furthermore, under Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 22(e) this Court has
jurisdiction to consider Mr. Anderson's challenge of his consecutive sentences. Utah
Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 (e) allows this Court to correct an illegal sentence or one
that is imposed in an illegal manner "at any time," which means this Court is permitted to
consider the legality of Mr. Anderson's sentence regardless of whether he properly
preserved the issue below. Utah R. Crim. P. 22 (e); State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241,
K28n.ll,31P.3d615.

2

In addition, Judge Reese did not have jurisdiction to order the original sentence
consecutive. See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)("[o]nce a
court imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case."). "It is
well-settled that subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by either party or
the court." State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 60, ^ 4, 65 P.3d 1191,1191 (citing State v.
Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 930 (Utah 1992)). "Subject matter jurisdiction ccan neither be
waived nor conferred by consent of the accused. Objection to the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter may be urged at any stage of the proceedings, and the right to
make such an objection is never waived.'" State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, ^ 5, 97
P.3d 732, 736 (quoting James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)).
Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to review Mr. Anderson's challenge to the
trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences after it failed to designate such terms in
the final written order of judgment in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights
against double jeopardy and in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003).
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT, WITHOUT JURISDICTION, INCREASED
MR. ANDERSON'S SENTENCE IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RIGHTS AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY WHEN IT
ORDERED THAT HIS ORIGINAL SENTENCE RUN CONSECUTIVE TO
LATER CONVICTIONS UPON PROBATION REVOCATION.
Contrary to the state's argument, when the trial court revoked Mr. Anderson's
probation and imposed the original sentence to run consecutively to new convictions
entered after the original sentence was entered in this case, it effectively increased his
sentence. See Appellee's Brief at 8. The order that the original sentence run
consecutively with newly acquired sentences was an increase in sentence because: (a) the
3

trial court that revoked probation did not have jurisdiction to order the original sentence
to run consecutively, but only had the statutory authority to impose the original sentence,
and; (b) Judge Atherton who had the statutory authority to impose consecutive or
concurrent sentences implemented a concurrent sentencing scheme; thus by imposing a
consecutive sentence, Judge Reese thereby increased the length of the sentence contrary
to the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT THAT REVOKED PROBATION DID NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE TO RUN
CONSECUTIVELY, RATHER IT ONLY HAD THE STATUTORY
AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE.

Defendant does not assert that Judge Noel originally imposed concurrent sentencing,
rather Mr. Anderson asserts that Judge Noel was without statutory authority to order the
original sentence as concurrent or consecutive because Mr. Anderson did not have any
other sentences on the date the original sentence was imposed. See Appellee's Brief at
10. Moreover, once probation is revoked, the trial court only has the statutory authority
to impose that original sentence and is without jurisdiction to order that original sentence
consecutive or concurrent under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(l)(2003). This statute
provides:
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than
one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the
offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of
judgment and commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to
each other; and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively
with any other sentences the defendant is already serving.

4

Id. Judge Noel did not have the authority to use the provisions of this statute because at
the time the original sentence was imposed, this statute was inapplicable.
Additionally Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 22(a) provides that:
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court
shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor
more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). This rule further illustrates that there is a set time for sentencing
after a conviction mandated at "not less than two nor more than 45 days." Id. Judge
Noel complied with this rule, but Judge Reese did not have the jurisdiction to modify
that sentence much later than the rule mandates for the original sentence to be imposed.
As the state has acknowledged and argued before this Court, "once a court imposes a
valid sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case."1 State v. Montoya, 825
P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). It is not authorized thereafter to amend the

1

The state does not argue in its response that Judge Reese had the jurisdiction to modify
the sentence, but rather argues that by ordering the original sentence consecutive to later
sentences, Judge Reese was not increasing the sentence. This is critical as the state has
acknowledged that any reduction or increase after the original sentence has been entered
is beyond the trial court's jurisdiction. See Appellee's Brief at 8-14, State v. Slater, Case
No. 20050012-C A at Addendum A. In Slater, the state argues that a trial court is without
jurisdiction to reduce a sentence upon probation revocation under Utah Code Ann. § 763-402. Decision was rendered for this case in an unpublished opinion. See State v.
Slater, 2005 UT App 457 (memorandum decision). Like the argument advanced by the
state in Slater, Judge Reese is similarly without jurisdiction to alter a sentence previously
imposed. It is appropriate that the state has not argued that Judge Reese had jurisdiction
to modify the original sentence because it has long been recognized by Utah courts that
prosecutors, unlike private attorneys, represent the sovereign and it is imperative that they
advance a uniform interpretation of the law in order to ensure that justice is done. See
generally State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756 (Utah 2001).
5

sentence unless the sentence is illegal or imposed in an illegal manner. See Utah R.
Crim. P. 22(e) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time."). Pursuant to Utah's statutory scheme, once probation is
revoked, the trial court is granted the authority to sentence only in the narrowly defined
circumstances where the defendant has not previously been sentenced, or to execute the
sentence previously imposed. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(e)(ii)(2003).
In this case, a definite sentence had already been imposed, thus the trial court's
jurisdiction was limited to executing that previously imposed sentence. Utah's statutory
framework does not give the trial court jurisdiction to determine whether the previously
imposed sentence should be ordered to run consecutively or concurrently. The trial court
is limited to merely executing the original sentence. "Where the statutory language is
plain and unambiguous, [Utah courts] do not look beyond the language's plain meaning
to divine legislative intent." State v. Kenison, 2000 UT App 322, \ 10, 14 P.3d 129
(quoting State v. Tryba, 2000 UT App 230,113, 8 P.3d 274, 278.). "Thus, [Utah courts]
will interpret a statute according to its plain language, unless such a reading is
unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of
the statute." Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562-63 (Utah 1996). "Unambiguous
language in the statute . . . may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning." Zoll
& Branch, P.C.v.Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997)(emphasis added).
Likewise Utah courts assume that the Legislature has worded statutes
intentionally and include or exclude things purposely. "The fact that the legislature
plainly articulated a plaintiffs required state of mind but was silent as to whether the
6

plaintiff must have relied on the untruth or omission to recover clearly indicates that the
legislature did not intend to adopt a reliance requirement." Wood, 919 P.2d at 563.
Utah courts will not supplement or add to what the legislature has clearly expressed, but
instead assumes the legislature "to have used the involved terms advisedly and could
easily have incorporated language allowing" the trial court statutory power to modify an
original sentence upon probation revocation, but it did not. Deland v. Uintah County,
945 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). When language is plain on its face, the court
will strictly give effect to that language and there is no discretion to change such
language to be more or less inclusive. See King v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 850 P.2d
1281, 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Accordingly, because the legislature clearly stated a
trial court only had the authority to sentence a defendant if no sentence was previously
imposed or execute the original sentence, it did not give trial courts the authority to alter
an original sentence and order it to run consecutively when such an order could not have
been part of the original sentence.
Judge Atherton was the only judge who had jurisdiction and statutory authority to
order the sentences to run concurrently or consecutively in this case as when she
implemented sentence, Mr. Anderson had more than just one sentence. Judge Atherton
appropriately considered all the required factors and ordered a concurrent sentencing
scheme. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 13. Courts have held that when a sentencing
court orders sentences to be served concurrently, the defendant is "technically serving
more than one sentence, as a practical matter he is serving only one." Carlin v. Commsr.
Of Correction, 243 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Mass. 1969). Thus, when a judge "orders
7

sentences to be served concurrently, this order creates a sentencing scheme that
establishes a relationship between, or among the sentences. The concurrency order thus
becomes part of the sentences themselves." Commonwealth v. Bruzzeze, 773 NJE.2d
921, 926 (Mass. 2002). "Concurrent sentences are sentences that operate
simultaneously" State v. Martinez, 656 P.2d 911,912 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). "When a
sentence is changed from concurrent to consecutive, it is increased in length" Maryland
v. Sayre, 552 A.2d 553, 562 (Md. 1989). In this case, when Judge Noel changed Judge
Atherton's sentencing scheme from concurrent to consecutive, he effectively increased
the length of time Mr. Anderson was required to serve.
The court in Martinez enunciated that increasing concurrent sentences to
consecutive because of a revocation of probation is an "increase in penalty and violates
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy" Martinez, 656 P.2d at 913
(citations omitted). Likewise, in our case, because Mr. Anderson was already sentenced
to a concurrent sentencing scheme by the only judge with the jurisdiction and statutory
authority to consider whether sentences should be consecutive or concurrent, when
Judge Noel implemented the original sentence and then altered that sentence by ordering
it to be consecutively served, it resulted in an increase in penalty which violates the
prohibition against double jeopardy.
Moreover, when Utah courts analyze whether a sentence is increased or more
severe than an original or first sentence, they hold that "[t]he second sentence cannot
exceed the first in appearance or effect, in the number of its elements, or in their
magnitude." State v. Sorenson, 639 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah 1981)(internal citation
8

omitted). "This means that no new element of sentence can be added and that no new
element can be augmented in magnitude." Id. The consecutive order is an additional
element to the original sentence that could not have anticipated a consecutive order
because at the time of sentencing, there was only one sentence. Thus, under Utah's
statutory scheme and court rules, when Judge Reese ordered the original sentence to run
consecutive to later sentences ordered concurrent, he increased the original sentence
thereby violating the prohibition against double jeopardy.
B.

OTHER JURISDICTIONS THAT ALLOW FOR UPWARD
MODIFICATIONS OR MODIFICATIONS TO ORIGINAL SENTENCE
AFTER PROBATION REVOCATION ARE CONTROLLED BY
STATUTES CONTRARY TO OR DISTINCT FROM THE UTAH
STATUTE.

The cases upon which the state relies to show that other jurisdictions have allowed for
modifications of the original sentence upon probation revocation are irrelevant to this
analysis because: (a) none of these cases have binding precedent upon this court, but
more importantly; (b) these jurisdictions are controlled by statutes that explicitly allow
for modifications to the original sentence upon probation revocation, contrary to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(ii)(2003).
The state cites to United States v. Olivarez-Martinez for the proposition that a court
can order an original sentence consecutive to intervening sentences upon probation
revocation. Brief of Appellee at 12-13 (citing United States v. Olivarez-Martinez, 767
F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1985)). The holding in Olivarez-Martinez is that a district court can
implement a sentence consecutive to a federal sentence upon probation revocation. 767

9

F.2d at 1137. However, in that case, where the sentence has been suspended during
probation, the federal statute allowed for implementation of the original sentence or any
lesser sentence. Id. In Olivarez-Martinez, the trial court decreased incarceration time
from 54 months to 46 months in addition to ordering the sentence to run consecutive with
an intervening federal sentence. Id. First, this decision is not binding on this Court.
Second, Olivarez-Martinez is analyzing a federal statutory framework separate and
distinct from the relevant Utah statutes under consideration in this case. By contrast, in
State v. Slater, the defendant argued that he should be able to reduce his conviction after
probation revocation under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (2003). 2005 UT App 457
(memorandum decision); Case No. 20050012-CA. Similarly, the federal statutory
framework in Olivarez-Martinez grants the trial court discretion in applying a reduced
sentence upon probation revocation. Olivarez-Martinez, 767 F.2d at 1137. However, the
state argued in Slater that the trial court was without jurisdiction under Utah rule to alter a
sentence already imposed in order to allow for a reduced sentence. See Addendum A.
Although the court allows for such a reduction under the federal statute in OlivarezMartinez, this same action may be prohibited under the Utah statute. This is illustrative of
the important statutory differences between the relevant Utah statutory framework and
the federal statutory framework under consideration in Olivarez-Martinez.
Similarly, the state cites to State v. Holcomb for this proposition. Brief of Appellee at
14 (citing State v. Holcomb, 360 S.E.2d 232 (W.Va. 1987)). However, in Holcomb,
unlike in Mr, Anderson's case, the trial court was not executing an original sentence.
Instead, the trial court was sentencing the defendant in Holcomb for the first time since
10

probation revocation. Holcomb, 360 S.e.2d at 235. Accordingly, West Virginia law
allows for the trial judge to impose sentence for the first time, rather than being restricted
to implementing the original sentence. See W. Va. Code § 62-12-10 (2005).
Likewise, in Williams v. Wainwright the statute under which the defendant was
sentenced after probation revocation clearly provides "[t]he court. . .shall.. . impose any
sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on
probation." Wainwright, 493 F. Supp. 153, 154 (S.D. Fla. 1980)(quoting Fla. Stat. §
948.06(1)). Compare this statutory language with Utah's statute which provides:
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may
order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term
commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously
imposed shall be executed.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(e)(ii)-(iii)(2003).
The statute relied on in State v. Jones similarly allowed for the trial court to
implement any sentence that could have originally been imposed. Jones, 418 N.W.2d
782, 786 (N.D. 1988)(quoting N.D. Stat. § 12.1-32-07(4)). Thus, the court stated "[t]his
includes a sentence which is more severe than the sentence originally imposed. Therefore
Jones should have expected that a violation of the conditions of his probation could result
in a harsher sentence." Id. at 786. This expectation that the North Dakota statutory
framework gave the defendant placed him on notice that his sentence was not considered
final, thus this is the reason double jeopardy was not implicated. The statutory
framework in State v. Perkins also allows a trial court to impose a fine if one has not

11

previously been imposed and impose any sentence it could have originally imposed.
Perkins, 435 A.2d 504 (N.H. 1981)( citing N.H. Rev. Stat. § 651:2(VII)). The statute
relied on in Smith v. State also allowed for the trial court, upon probation revocation, to
"'revoke the probation or the suspension of sentence and may impose any sentence which
might originally have been imposed.'" Smith v. State, 307 N.E.2d 281, 281-2 (Ind.
1974)(quoting Ind. Code, Ann. § 9-2211). Finally, the statute relied on in State v. Payne
also allowed for resentencing to any term which might have originally been imposed.
Payne, 455 So.2d 1055 (Fla. 1981)
There is no language in the Utah statute which would give the sentencing court the
power to reconsider the sentence and impose any sentence that it originally could have
imposed at the time of sentencing if a sentence had already been imposed. Accord
Wood, 919 P.2d at 563 ("The fact that the legislature plainly articulated a plaintiffs
required state of mind but was silent as to whether the plaintiff must have relied on the
untruth or omission to recover clearly indicates that the legislature did not intend to adopt
a reliance requirement."). Double jeopardy implicates a defendant's expectation in the
finality of his or her sentence. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 193-94
(1873). When a state statute is crafted in such a manner to clearly place a defendant on
notice that if she violates probation, the terms of her original sentence may be modified,
then she has no expectation of finality in her sentence. The North Dakota Supreme Court
analyzing a double jeopardy claim under a statute that allows for modification of the
original sentence commented: "[t]hus [defendant] should have expected that a violation
of the conditions of his probation could result in a harsher sentence." Jones, 418 N.W.2d
12

at 785. However, the Utah statute does not allow for such modification and thus a
defendant who has been issued a suspended sentence has an expectation in the finality of
that sentence upon probation revocation. Thus, double jeopardy is implicated in the
instant case.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons and those more fully set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief, Mr.
Anderson respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's imposition of his
original sentence as consecutive to the aggravated robbery convictions he is serving in
another case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ) V ^ day of January, 2006.

^ L i ^ k ^ ^
Josie EjBrumfield
Debra M. Nelson
C. Bevan Corry
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
^

13

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOSIE E. BRUMFIELD, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered
the original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South
State, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to
the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this ) \ ' ^ day of January 26,
2006.

J O S i E. BRUMFIELD

U

DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's
Office as indicated above this lis

day of January, 2006.

iDL

14

ADDENDUM A

ARGUMENT
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW DEFENDANT'S
CLAIM BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT TIMELY APPEAL HIS
CONVICTION

Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for a section 402 reduction in his sentence. Br. App. at 12-16. Specifically,
he asserts that the trial court failed to "consider the circumstances of the offense and
[defendant's] character and history before denying his motion." Br. App. at 15.
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review defendant's claim because the claim
concerns defendant's conviction and sentence, which he did not appeal.
A. Defendant's appeal is limited to review of the trial court's
revocation of his probation.

Generally, a defendant who desires to appeal his conviction and sentence
must file a notice of appeal within thirty days of entry of the final judgment. See
Utah R. App. P. 3(a), 4(a). The sentencing order is usually the final order that
disposes of the case and starts the thirty-day window for appealing a conviction and
sentence. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT100,14,57 P.3d 1065; State v. Walker, 2002 UT
App 290,111, 55 P.3d 1165. Failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives the
appellate court of jurisdiction over the case. See Bowers, 2002 UT 100, % 5 (noting
that thirty-day period for filing notice of appeal is jurisdictional and cannot be
enlarged by court); State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36,37 (Utah 1981) (same).
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Post-judgment orders by the trial court do not resurrect a defendant's right to
appeal his underlying conviction and sentence, unless the order concerns a timely
motion under rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. For example, the Utah
Supreme Court held in State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, \ 17, 106 P.3d 729, that a
restitution order entered several months after the final judgment was "not a new
and final judgment for purposes of appealing the underlying merits of a criminal
conviction/ 7

Likewise, this Court has held that a revocation of a defendant's

probation does not renew the time to appeal the original judgment. See State v. Love,
2001 UT App 79, f 3 (unpublished memorandum decision), attached as Addendum
B.
Rather, appeals from non-rule 4(b) judgments are limited to review of that
particular judgment. Appeals from post-judgment orders are permitted by statute if
they concern an "order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of the
defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(b) (West 2004). The right to appeal a
post-judgment order is distinct and separate, however, from a defendant's right to
appeal a "final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(a) (West 2004). For example, an appeal from a post-judgment
restitution order is limited to review only of the propriety of the restitution order.
See Garner, 2005 UT 6,117. Similarly, an appeal from a probation revocation order,
as in the instant case, is limited to examining the propriety of the probation
9

revocation, not the underlying conviction or sentence. Defendant may not use the
revocation order to reach back in time and resurrect issues relating to his conviction
and sentence. See Love, 2001 UT App 79,13
Inasmuch as defendant appeals from a post-judgment order revoking his
probation, this Court only has jurisdiction to consider the denial of his section 402
motion if the trial court had jurisdiction at the probation revocation hearing to
entertain a section 402 motion. Cf. State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 681 (Utah App.
1991) (holding that since trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence Montoya,
appellate court had no jurisdiction to review resentencing).
B. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reduce the degree of an
offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) once it enters a
valid final judgment.

Under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1), a court may only
reduce the degree of the offense before it sentences the offender and enters a final
judgment. The statute does not authorize the court to amend an offender's
conviction and sentence after entry of the final judgment
A court's authority to reduce the degree of an offense is statutory, and the
scope and limits of that authority are thus a matter of statutory interpretation.
"When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first looking to
the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the
language is ambiguous/' Blackner v. Dep't ofTransp., 2002 UT 44,112,48 P.3d 949.
10

The Court's primary goal "is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by
the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve/ 7 State
v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, \ 25,4 P.3d 795. The Court reads the statutory language so as
"'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful/" State v. Maestas, 2002
UT 123,1 52, 63 P.3d 621 (quoting Utah v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, % 10, 44 P.3d
680) (emphasis and brackets in Maestas). Accordingly, "'effect must be given, if
possible, to every word, clause, and sentence of a statute

No clause[,] sentence

or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the construction
can be found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute/" Id.
at <[ 53 (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction §46:06 (4th
ed. 1984)).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) states the following:
If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the
offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and
character of the defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to
record the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by
statute and to sentence the defendant to an alternative normally
applicable to that offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically
provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower
degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 2

2

Subsection (2) of the statute provides alternative conditions for reducing a
third degree felony to a class A misdemeanor. As defendant challenges his
conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, subsection (2) does not

apply.
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Subsection (1) authorizes a court to reduce the classification of an offense by
one degree if the court concludes that the statutory degree is too harsh in light of the
offender's history and the circumstances of the crime. The last phrase in subsection
(1) states that the court may reduce the level of the offense and then "impose
sentence accordingly." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402(1). The direction to "impose
sentence accordingly" suggests an intent by the legislature that courts only use
subsection (1) to reduce a conviction before sentencing. That construction is
consistent with this Court's and the Utah Supreme Court's prior holdings regarding
the jurisdiction of a trial court after sentencing.
"Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction
over the case." State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676,679 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v.
Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, % 10,84 P.3d 854. It may not thereafter revisit the case to
set aside or amend the sentence unless the sentence is illegal. See Utah R. Crim. P.
22(e) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, at any time."); State v. Finlayson, 2004 UT 10, \ 16,84 P.3d 1193 (concluding
that trial court had no jurisdiction to resentence Finlayson after remittitur of appea
in which one of three convictions was reversed); State v. McGuire, 2005 UT App 13, *|
5 (unpublished memorandum decision) (explaining that once a court imposes <
valid sentence, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction to resentence thi
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defendant, and the appellate court has no authority to review any purported
resentencing), attached as Addendum C 3
Construing subsection (1) to allow a court to reduce the classification of an
offense after sentencing would open the door for offenders to seek reclassification
and resentencing months or even years after the final judgment.

Such an

interpretation is inimical to the interests of finality in judicial proceedings, as well as
against the plain language of the statute. It would put the final judgment in limbo
leaving it forever open to possible reclassification and a new appeal based on the
denial of the reclassification. As shown by the plain language of the statue, the
legislature did not intend such a result.
Permitting courts to reduce the degree of a conviction only before entry of the
final order is also consistent with rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. That
rule states that motions to reduce a criminal offense must be filed at least ten days
before sentencing. See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c)(2).4

Courts may, however, revoke, modify, or extend probation within the
guidelines set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West 2004). Where a prison
sentence has already been imposed but is suspended, revocation of probation is not
resentencing, but rather, execution of an already imposed sentence. See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(e)(iii) ("If the probation is revoked, the defendant shall be
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed").
4

The rule was amended on April 1,2005, to permit parties to file a motion to
reduce a third degree felony under section 402(2) anytime after sentencing.
13

Such a construction of subsection (1) is not only consistent with its plaii
language and the rules and precedent of this Court, it is also good policy, i
reduction under subsection (1) requires the court to consider "the nature am
circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty/7 Utah Cod
Ann. § 76-3-402(1). These are matters that the trial court must already consider i
imposing sentence. See State v. Helms, 2002 UT12, \ 8,40 P.3d 626 (requiring tri<
courts to consider all legally relevant factors in sentencing). They are also mattei
that may be difficult to consider at a probation revocation hearing held months (
even years after the final judgment. This is particularly true in cases where tl
defendant pleads guilty and there is little or no record of the details of the offens
The State may lose track of victims and witnesses and may return or destrc
exhibits, all of which could be necessary to consider "the nature and circumstanc
of the offense/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1).
C. Because defendant raises no claim related to the revocation
of his probation, this Court lacks jurisdiction over his
appeal.

Defendant's only claim before this Court is that the trial court erred
denying his motion to reduce the degree of his offense. Br. Aplt. at 13-16.
appeals, however, from the court's order revoking his probation, which occun
more than a year after the final judgment (R. 102). He does not challenge the ba
for the revocation. Although defendant moved for a section 402 reduction at

probation revocation hearing, the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain such a
motion. See supra subpoint B. Inasmuch as the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the motion, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion
and should dismiss the case. Cf. Montoya, 825 P.2d at 681 (holding that since trial
court's lacked jurisdiction to resentence Montoya, appellate court had no
jurisdiction to review resentencing).5
D. Even if this Court had jurisdiction, defendant's claim is
meritless.

Even if this Court had jurisdiction to review defendant's claim, the claim is
meritless. The Utah Supreme Court has treated motions to reduce the degree of an
offense as a sentencing issue for which trial courts have wide discretion. See State v.
Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \ 31, 25 P.3d 985. This Court must afford the trial court "wide
latitude and discretion in sentencing/7 State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah
1997). "[A] sentence imposed by the trial court should be overturned only when it
is inherently unfair or clearly excessive/' Id.
Defendant candidly acknowledges that "[t]here was evidence to support the
trial court's sentence/7 Br. Aplt. at 14. He refers to the PSI, which categorized him

5

The question of jurisdiction was not raised in the trial court. This Court
may, however, affirm a lower court on any ground apparent in the record. See State
v. Cheure, 2000 UT App 6 , f 1 2 , 994 P.2d 1278. Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction
may be raised at anytime. See Montoya, 825 P.2d at 679.
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